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Abstract: Among the defining criteria of a fallacy, Douglas Walton requires that its flaw must be serious. This
allows his distinction between “serious” fallacies, minor ones, or mere blunders. But what makes a fallacy serious?
Isn’t being fallacious serious enough? Walton leaves these questions unanswered but often calls to his distinction
between sophism and paralogism. Several ways to apply the adjective “serious” to fallacies are discussed. Some
depend on the type, others on structural aspects, and others on a dialectical background.
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1. Introduction
Douglas Walton's concept of fallacy is not straightforward if you heed all the conditions he
requires to define it. The last sentence of his A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (1995) states that:
(1) A fallacy is a particularly serious kind of error, or an infraction of the rules of
dialogue, identified with a baptizable type of argumentation that has been abused in
such a way to impede the goals of a type of dialogue the participants in the
argumentation were rightly supposed to be engaged in. (p. 303)
My concern is the requirement that the error making an argument fallacious is “serious.”
You can broadly understand the meaning of this familiar, vague, and equivocal term: for
instance, we often distinguish between a minor and a serious error. For Walton, fallacies would
belong to the serious kind. Fallacies being a messy and controversial topic, you can also
charitably grant that the difference between a fallacious and a non-fallacious argument is not
always as clear-cut as some would like it to be when they object that, minor or not, an error is an
error.
Walton has tried to find a balance in his theories on fallacies between two extreme positions,
two poles that he rejects when he comes close to them. According to the first one that we could
broadly call the logical one, a close examination of the intrinsic properties of a suspect argument
– understood as a premises/conclusion system – is sufficient to determine whether or not it is
fallacious. According to the second one, let us call it the dialectical pole—typically illustrated by
the pragma-dialectical approach: what makes an argument fallacious is that it makes an
infraction to the rules of a dialogue. For pragma-dialecticians, a fallacy does not respect the rules
of a normative critical discussion. For Walton, it does not respect the rules of one of the six more
empirically based kinds of dialogue that he fostered. He also claims that a fallacy is often
associated with a shift from one kind of dialogue to another one.
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The inclusion of a pragmatic and even a dialectical, or dialogical dimension to explain what
a fallacy is and how it works seems quite reasonable for someone who – like me – follows the
ancient tradition that considers a fallacy as a two-faced1 argument, because each face is
associated with a different linguistic aspect2 bound to different uses and values of the argument
(or of parts of it).
Walton’s theory of fallacies is subtle and full of changing nuances: it describes complex
situations but leaves me a bit embarrassed by its way to identify a fallacy. The vagueness of the
adjective “serious” in the requirement that an argument should include or produce a “serious X”
to be a fallacy seems an incentive to rely on intuition or common sense to evaluate whether it is
fallacious or not. Unfortunately, intuitions and common sense are sometimes helpless in the face
of a fallacy, especially a serious one, if you grant that a clever fallacy should not involve an
obvious mistake, blunder or trick. If we follow Aristotle's Sophistical refutations, if the flaw of
an argument is too salient – too serious in some sense – nobody will take it seriously and be
fooled. Some people use this point to doubt the interest of a study of fallacies: they say that the
flaws of the examples of textbooks are generally too big to fool anybody. Hence, you should not
loose time with this topic. So, if a fallacy is a seriously bad argument, the way it is seriously bad
should be clarified, although I confess that I doubt that it is a necessary condition to identify a
fallacy. Minor fallacies are fallacies, whereas stupid fallacies might not be fallacies.
2. Walton’s definitions of fallacy
I will limit my discussion to Walton's case, although other authors advocate that the flaw of an
argument must be serious to call it a fallacy. Adler (1996, p. 329), for instance, writes: “To
evaluate an argument as a fallacy is to attribute to it a serious failure of reasoning.”
Let us start with (2) and (3), two definitions, more detailed than (1). They come from two
books: A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (1995, pp. 237-238) and Methods of Argumentation
(2013, pp. 247-248).
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(2) A Pragmatic theory of Fallacy.

(3) Methods of Argumentation

A fallacy is paradigmatically :

A fallacy is :

1. … a failure, lapsed, or error, subject to
criticism, correction or rebuttal (...wrong use
of argumentation schemes)

1. An argument

2. … a failure that occurs in what is supposed
to be an argument (argument requirement).

2. … that is often an instance of a defeasible
argumentation scheme

3. … a failure associated with deception, or
illusion.

3. ...that is reasonable, but is somehow used
wrongly

4. … a violation of one or more of the
maxims of reasonable dialogue or a departure
from acceptable procedures in that type of
dialogue.

4. ...that falls short of the standard of proof
set for it in the dialogue the arguer is
supposed to be taking part in.

In principle, this requirement could be generalized to more than two. In practice, two is quite enough.
I use this broad term to stress that the difference is related to syntax or semantics or pragmatics.
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5. … an instance of an underlying,
systematic kind of wrongly applied
technique of reasonable argumentation
(argumentation theme)

5. ...that plausibly seems correct (in its given
context of dialogue)

6. … a serious violation, as opposed to an
incidental blunder, error, or weakness of
execution.

6. and committing it poses a serious obstacle
to reaching the goal of the dialogue

Separated by almost twenty years, these definitions show a few differences, but also striking
similarities, including the qualification of ‘serious’ in the last condition.
They are closely connected: the most recent one comes from a chapter beginning with a
reminder of the oldest and is introduced as an “improvement on the pragmatic definition”,
namely the oldest. This will be enough for us to consider them as representative of Walton's
concept of fallacy, despite slight changes.
What can be said about the word ‘serious’? It can be a merely factual descriptive term, for
instance when you compare two pictures of a human face. One will be said serious because it
expresses no emotion, whereas the other will be said to be not-serious because, for instance, the
person is laughing while blinking an eye. However, ‘serious’ is very often a normative moral
term: something is serious because it conforms to an expectation, a norm, an ideal type or
situation: “This is a serious work”, “Fred is not a serious person”, “The ontological argument is
not really serious.” Sometimes you can hesitate between a factual and a normative interpretation:
“This was a serious fight.” ‘Serious’ can also be used as a gradual term: this is very serious,
serious, rather serious, not very serious (but serious), not serious, not serious at all, and so on. It
also allows comparisons: you can find some things more serious than others. Furthermore,
people may disagree about whether something is serious or not, and how serious it is. Especially
in the case of a controversial argument! So, to make a decision, we need more information and
analysis. A first question to Walton could then be: can you provide any criterion to decide that
the “kind of error” in (1), the “violation” in (2), the “obstacle” in (3), is (really) serious?
3. The right tool for the right use
In definition (2), “serious” qualifies a « violation » of at least one of “the maxims of reasonable
dialogue” or “a departure from acceptable procedures in that type of dialogue.” In (3), it is the
“obstacle” to the goals of dialogue that is serious. This violation, or that obstacle, is itself
produced – according to Walton's very words – by a wrong use (of an argument) “that falls short
of the standard of proof set for in the dialogue, but seems plausibly correct.” Hence, the
violation, or the obstacle, is the manifestation of this “wrong use”. Walton claims that, by itself,
the structural argument is not sufficient to produce this effect: it has to be used in a specific kind
of dialogue, with all its requirements. I grant the principle that an argument has to be used to put
its potential badness at work. Yet, it seems to me that the very possibility of a wrong use depends
on prior features that are proper to the argument, often to its very type. Perhaps, not any
argument would lead to a wrong use. The idea of a pragmatic abuse, more precisely of a kind of
cheating, is already present in the first page of On Sophistical Refutations when Aristotle
illustrates how a paralogism can be abusive. But he also stresses that it depends on a structural
property of the argument: it comes “from a similarity” (1064a, p. 25). But not any similarity.
3

Let us follow this idea. You can use a screwdriver to drive a screw or to stab someone. Why
is it more difficult to stab someone with a tomato? Because it lacks some similarities with a
knife, even if you can murder someone with a tomato.3 On the other hand, it is not serious to try
to stab someone who wears an iron shield. To perform an action in the right way you certainly
need the right kind of tool but also other relevant conditions. The first time you hand a
screwdriver to a child, you will perhaps tell her: “Be careful, you could hurt someone, even
yourself!” You foresee kinds of deviant uses that a clever child could discover by herself, “from
a similarity” between a screwdriver and a knife. To understand that an argument or a kind of
argument is fallacious, amounts to understanding – more or less quickly – that it can be used in a
misleading way. To understand is enough, you don’t have to get into details. A screwdriver can
have an indefinite number of deviant uses, but to understand that it can be dangerous you need to
imagine at least one dangerous use. A fallacious argument can be dangerous: this disposition is
enough to make it an actual (kind of) weapon, i.e. an object that can make serious damages.
On Walton's account, to be fallacious is not an intrinsic property of a type of argument, nor
of a particular token. In other words, you cannot decide whether a particular argument is
fallacious just by inspection, without taking into account the type of dialogue, its goal and its
rules. If I correctly interpret Walton's position, the possibility of a deviant (misleading) use is not
enough to make of a structural argument a fallacy: it is only if it is actually used in a non-critical
way and, so, violates a rule or creates a serious obstacle that it is a fallacy. The type of the
argument only makes it an acceptable candidate to the status of fallacy: it has to be used in a
seriously wrong way to become a fallacy. Potentiality is not enough; Walton requires actuality.
To return to the screwdriver used as a dagger, Walton's position amounts to saying that a
screwdriver is dangerous only if it has actually been used in a way that has made serious
damages. Danger is a posteriori.
Furthermore, as suggested by our previous short discussion of the concept of ‘serious’, the
lack of any explicit and sharp criterion to distinguish between serious and non-serious obstacle or
violation, paves the way to a gradual status of fallacy. Thus, according to the (kind of) verbal
exchange, the same argument could be more or less fallacious. Several aspects of Walton's
position go in this direction that makes of fallacies gradual sins, for example when he considers
as not seriously fallacious the use of an argumentation scheme that is logically or critically
wrong but does not create serious obstacles to the goals of a dialogue. Here is a quotation where
the potential of the type of the argument is not sufficient to make a fallacy. You still have to
climb the moral scale to reach the status of full (serious) fallacy. A blunder is not a fallacy:
(4) In a typical case of this type [i.e when you have not enough material to decide
between a fallacy and a weak but non fallacious argument], an argument may be an
instance of a general technique associated with a fallacy – for example it may be an ad
hominem argument – but the error committed does not seem serious enough to justify
calling it a fallacy as used in this particular instance. It may seem more like a blunder
than a fallacy in this instance. (1995, p. 236)
Another consequence of this kind of gradual view will be discussed in next section on the
importance of the arguer's intention – or lack of intention – to deceive.
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You can perhaps try to choke her with the tomato!
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You could object to the requirement of a serious damage that the traditional concept of
fallacy – if there is such a thing as a traditional concept of fallacy – is often introduced,
illustrated and understood by means of examples of structural arguments that are said fallacious
without any explicit association to a type of dialogue they would block. Although he is not very
keen on psychological speculations, at least on that matter, Walton would perhaps reply that
when you grasp that an argument is fallacious, you have in mind two (kinds of) dialogues: one
where the argument is fine, one where it creates a serious obstacle. Although I grant that to
understand that an argument is fallacious requires foreseeing two diverging linguistic uses, I
doubt that they always clearly are two dialogues with specific goals and rules, partly broken in
one case but not in the other. We don’t need all this with the fallacies that Aristotle called
“depending on language”, somewhat neglected today. General semantic competence is enough
here: you don’t have to get into explicit pragmatic details. Take Hamblin's example (1970, p.
12): “Everything that runs has feet; the river runs: therefore, the river has feet.” A basic
knowledge of English is sufficient to acknowledge the two faces of ‘run’, or the metaphor, and
then the possibility of a trick. Some fallacies are like puns (many are puns): they play on words
and so, only indirectly on distinct speech situations. You don’t always need to conceive a
dialogue, moreover with specific goals and rules, to grasp that an argument is fallacious. This is
the case of most “fallacies dependent on language” and it is interesting to note that they belong
to the “seven major fallacies that do not fit any of the argumentation schemes” (Walton, 2013, p
223). This suggests that Walton’s theory of fallacy is not global but local and that his
requirement of a “serious” flaw is limited to a specific subset of pragmatic situations.
Yet, you can also find in Walton's writings some definitions less focused on the dialectical
requirement, to the benefit of the logical one. For instance: (5) “According to the new theory, a
fallacy is (first and foremost) an argumentation scheme used wrongly” (1995, p. 18). But, as
shown by the case of these seven major fallacies, the scope of the usefulness of the notion of
argumentation schemes for the study of fallacies is more limited in 2013 than in 1995 where
some arguments are even “inherently fallacious”, while others “can be reasonable”.4 Other
examples of a balanced position between the logical and the dialectical poles can be found in (1)
and in (6): “According to the new theory, a fallacy is an underlying, systematic error or deceptive
tactic” (1995, p 15). The disjunction in (6) suggests that a fallacy can have two independent
sources: either a “systematic error” unfortunately committed or a deliberate “deceptive tactic”.
This alternative is a bit surprising, for it appears a few lines after the following passage that only
stresses the dialectical pole and the (presumably) bad intentions of the arguer:
(7) The new theory is not a psychologistic theory but a pragmatic theory. It is a rich
explication of the concept of fallacy as a calculated tactic or deceptive attack or defense
when two people reason together in contestive disputation. So conceived, a fallacy is
not only a violation of a rule of a critical discussion but a distinctive kind of technique
of argumentation that has been used to block the goals of a dialogue, while deceptively
maintaining an air of plausibility, either by using a type of argumentation that could be
correct in other cases or even by shifting to a different kind of dialogue illicitly and
covertly. (1995, p. 15)
According to (7), the use of an argumentation that “could be correct in other cases” is only
an option, not a necessary condition for a fallacy since the arguer could covertly shift to another
4

See the problem of “fallacy names” in A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (p. 209-211).
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kind of dialogue. But a will “to block the goals of dialogue” appears necessary in both cases. On
the other hand, to avoid the radical split between structural flaws and dialectical stakes that may
be suggested by the disjunction, you could interpret (6) not as stating two independent ways to
product a fallacy, but as a return to the idea of a two-faces phenomenon or entity, just like in the
case of homonymy (one word for two things) or synonymy (one thing for two words). This
seems closer to the spirit of Walton's new theory,5 but this interpretation is not plausible in (6)
because of the tension between an error – especially a systematic one – and the free choice
associated with a tactic – especially calculated – and a deceptive attack.
A few lines further, we find again the disjunction: (8) “a serious error or deceptive tactic”,
where the adjective ‘serious’ qualifies the error rather than the deception. And still a few lines
further:
(9). The term 'fallacy' refers to an underlying systematic error or misdemeanor in the
structure of an argument, a basic flaw indicating that the argument is fundamentally flawed
in some way. A fallacy, therefore, is not just any error or violation of a rule of critical
discussion that occurs in an argument. It is a serious kind of underlying failure in the way
the argument was executed as a strategy in a conversational exchange, as a misleading or
deceptive tactic to get the best of one's speech partner. (p 15)
Because of the equivocation of the English word ‘argument’, you can hesitate on the
meaning of “the structure of an argument”, especially when associated with a misdemeanor. Is it
the structure of the premises-conclusion system or the structure of the process? Both? Is the
underlying systematic error relative to the structural argument while the deceptive tactic would
be relative to its use in the process? This seems the most plausible: the stress of words like
‘systematic’ or ‘basic flaw’ suggest a flawed product used to create a flaw in the process. But in
this case, the ambiguity of Walton’s numerous disjunctive formulations – met since (1) – should
be avoided.
A shift between the requirements of the logical and the dialectical poles appears again when
Walton takes some distance from the pragma-dialectical approach that notoriously stresses the
dialectical pole:
(10) The problem with the view of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst is that it sees all
violation of the rules of a critical discussion as fallacious. This procedure fails to
distinguish the relatively trivial violations blunders (non-fallacious errors that are failure
to support an argument adequately) and fallacies (more serious, systematic, underlying
errors, or deceptive tactics used), which mean that an argument is radically wrong, from
a logical point of view, in a way that makes it more difficult (or even impossible) to
repair. (1995, p. 16)
So, the pragma-dialectical criterion is too loose because it cannot discriminate a blunder
from a fallacy because it forgets that a fallacious argument is “radically wrong from a logical
point of view”. But notice that the disjunction between error and tactic is still offered.
All this makes our leading question sharper. What is and where is the serious wrong
essential to a fallacy? Is it a basic structural flaw in the premises-conclusion argument? Or the
violation of the rules of the dialogue that impedes reaching its goals? Both? Although a serious
5
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logical mistake does not entail a serious dialectical one, and a serious dialectical one does not
entail a serious logical one. And how do you decide whether it is serious or not?
4. Strategic maneuvering and the will to deceive
Quotations (4) and (10) make a distinction, often stressed by Walton, between a blunder and a
fallacy. The sixth condition in definition (2) also stresses the contrast between a “serious
violation” and “an incidental blunder, error, or weakness of execution.” This suggests that the
intentions of the arguer matter and could provide a decisive key to this elusive “serious” feature
that makes an argument fallacious.
Although he is not keen on psychological considerations, Walton maintains an old
distinction, often dropped or neglected in contemporary writings on fallacies. Definitions (2) and
(3) state that a fallacious argument “plausibly seems correct (in its given context of dialogue)”
(2013 version) or has a failure “associated with deception, or illusion” (1995 version). Let’s ask:
is this correct (but fake) appearance or this deceptive association intentional or not? A link
between a possible deception and the qualification of “serious” seems straightforward because of
the quite common tendency to consider that an intentional deception is morally more serious than
a non-intentional one.
Let us read Walton. After the claim that the examination of the pattern of two ad arguments
(ad hominem and ad autoritatem), hence of two kinds of arguments involving the status of the
opponent, is not sufficient to make a decision about their fallaciousness, he goes on:
(11) The fallacy in both instances is found not in the argumentation scheme, as applied
to a single argument, but in a pattern that can be found only by examining a connected
sequence of moves by both parties. (2013, p. 216)
In the context of this dynamic approach, Walton makes a distinction6 between two kinds of
fallacies. In some cases, a fallacy is merely a blunder or an error, while in other cases, it is a
sophistical tactic used to try to unfairly get the best of a speech partner in dialogue, typically by
verbal deception or trickery. The evidence of such a tactic can be found in the pattern of moves
made by both partners. The pragmatic theory published in 1995 already distinguished between
these two kinds of bad arguments. Both are fallacious; the distinction is somewhere else, namely
in the intentionality to deceive:
(12) The paralogism is the type of fallacy in which an error of reasoning is committed
typically by making a blunder by failing to meet some necessary requirement of an
argumentation scheme. The sophism is a sophistical tactic used to try to unfairly try to
get the best of a speech partner. (2013, p. 216)
A quick interpretation suggests that a paralogism is an involuntary wrong use of a kind of
argument, thus a mere mistake; whereas a sophism is deliberately used to deceive. In 1995,
Walton had already stuck to this approach: a paralogism “fails to be valid because it fails to fit
some structural (characteristically semantic) relation that the premises should bear to the
The principle of this distinction is not new. It can be found at least in Kant’s Logic (1819, § 90, p. 193) and relies
on the German distinction between Trugschluss and Fehlschluss. Walton discusses this German distinction in (1995,
p. 246-247)
6
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conclusion”, while a sophism is “the intentional perpetration of a deceitful trick or fraud of a
perpetrator on a victim” (1995, p. 244). Yet, in 2013, Walton purports that to draw the line
between “mere mistake” and “intentional deception,” would “miss the point.” (p. 218) He
explains that arguers with strong interests at stake, or fanatically committed to the position
advocated by the argument are “blind to the weaknesses in it that would be apparent to others not
so committed.” In this case, the deception is not intentional because the proponent does not see
the argument as faulty. Walton repeats that, in such cases, the arguer is “blind to errors that
others might find in it [i.e., this kind of argumentation].” I confess that I do not see how this
misses the point. I grant that people who have great interests at stake or are fanatically
committed to a point may use fallacious arguments deliberately, as well as without any
calculation, i.e., ‘blindly’. But this does not blur the line, even if we cannot say whether the
fallacy is deliberate or not. Blindness is a necessary condition to speak of an error or a blunder.
The fact that the agent does not “see as faulty” or “is blind” to something that others may see as
faulty is what makes an essential difference between an error or a blunder and a trick, a lie or a
sophism (in Walton's sense).
But Walton finally belittles the importance of intention because “it is an internal mental
concept that can be inferred only abductively on the basis of external evidence of what the agent
knew or considered.” (p. 218) I doubt the last part: when I put forward a sophism, I need no
abduction to know that it is fallacious. And I presume that it is also the case for other people:
they can utter a fallacious argument without recognizing that it is fallacious, but whenever they
utter a sophism, they know what they do. This makes a difference that, in some sense, can be
said a serious one.
Up to now, our hope that the intention to deceive would provide the stepping stone for the
Waltonian distinction between serious and non-serious bad arguments seems to misfire. Taking
again some distance from the dialectical pole, Walton seems to confirm this point:
(13) Whether it is intentional or unintentional does not really matter from a point of
view of analyzing the argument and deciding whether it should be considered fallacious.
What is important from a point of view of logical argumentation is the logical weakness
in the argument, or some fault in the pattern of argumentation, not some psychological
fault in the arguer. (2013, p. 218)
What does Walton mean when he says that the distinction between intentional and
unintentional « does not really matter » to decide whether an argument is fallacious? As
expected, from a logical point of view, the distinction does not matter. But, especially if we heed
(11), it matters from the interactional one: it is from this point of view that the distinction could
be identified as a serious one with serious practical consequences. This could be the reason why
Walton finally seems to acknowledge that intentions do matter: the will to deceive allows a
moral ranking, a sophism being morally more serious than a paralogism:
(14) The sophistical type of fallacy tends to be a more serious kind of problem than the
error of reasoning one. It is based on the idea that an organized rule-governed dialogue
in which arguments are exchanged, like a critical discussion, is partly adversarial but
also partly cooperative. […] Thus a critical discussion is like a free market economy in
which each side tries to win by having the strongest argument that will triumph over
those of its opponent. (2013, p. 218)
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Here, Walton suggests that the hierarchy in seriousness between the two forms of fallacy
can lead to an inversion that finally makes the flaw of the dialectical move more important – not
to say serious – than the logical one, even if you can imagine a clumsy sophism with no serious
impact on the dialogue and a paralogism leading to a shift toward an eristic exchange or a radical
break.
You can easily find passages where the intentionality to deceive appears essential to a
fallacy. For instance, among the previous quotations, (6) states that a fallacy is “a calculated
tactic or deceptive attack or defense” used “to block the goals of a dialogue”. Here, blunders and
paralogisms seem forgotten. In a more recent passage, explicitly devoted to sophisms, we also
read:
(15) Another problem is that to analyze fallacies properly, we have to explain how each
of them is used as an effective deceptive tactic that does work to fool people. The theory
of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren, 2010) is the best tool for this task because it
can take the strategic dimension of fallacies into account. (2013, p. 219)
Here again, “each” fallacy seems identified with a sophism, unless you can qualify a
succession of errors as a strategic maneuvering. Whereas (8) welcomes paralogisms and
sophisms under the umbrella of “fallacy,” Walton’s theory has a tendency to expel paralogisms
from it, as illustrated by (14) and (15). Expressions like “calculate,” “used to,” “deceptively
maintaining an air of plausibility,” “to fool people,” “deceptive tactic,” or “strategic” clearly are
intentional terms, far from the blindness typical of paralogisms, errors, and blunders.
5. Conclusion
Although his distinction between paralogism and sophism provides a scale to rank the dialectical
damages made by fallacious arguments, the sophistic dialectical damages being morally more
serious than the ones resulting from mere mistakes or blunders, Walton finally gives no stable
answer to our question on what makes a fallacy serious. He gives the impression to keep
hesitating between ascribing the serious of its flaw to a matter of logic or to a matter of dialectic.
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